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Abstract
A growing body of literature from the natural and the social sciences indicates that 
the rate of temperature increase is another key driver of total climate damages, next 
to the absolute increase in temperature compared to the pre-industrial level. None-
theless, the damage functions employed in integrated assessment models that aim 
at studying the economics of climate change usually are based solely on the abso-
lute temperature increase. Hence, these models neglect additional damages that 
will occur if the rate of temperature increase exceeds a certain threshold that over-
strains the adaptive capacities of ecological and social systems. In the present paper, 
we implement such rate-related damages in the well-known integrated assessment 
model DICE-2016R. Using the resulting model variant DICE-RD, we show for sev-
eral scenarios that an insufficient climate policy that ignores rate-related damages 
can lead to substantial economic losses.
Keywords Integrated assessment · DICE model · Climate policy · Rate of 
temperature increase
JEL Classification O44 · Q54 · Q58
1 Introduction
Studying the economics of climate change, economists often use so-called inte-
grated assessment models (IAMs) that combine the framework of a neoclassical 
growth model with a climate module. The major subject of study is the economically 
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optimal emission mitigation path, which accounts for mitigation costs on the one 
hand and climate damage costs on the other. The latter are represented by a dam-
age function that describes the economic impacts of climate change. Typically, these 
damage functions are based solely on the absolute temperature increase compared to 
the pre-industrial level, but not on the rate of temperature increase, i.e., the increase 
in temperature that occurs per decade.
However, as stressed several times in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (see 
IPCC 2014a), and as underlined by a growing body of literature from the natural 
and—to a smaller extent—from the social sciences, the rate of temperature increase 
is also an important driver of overall damages caused by climate change (see 
Sect. 2).1 Consequently, neglecting such rate-related damages can lead to suboptimal 
emission mitigation caused by an underestimation of damages.
This paper incorporates rate-related damages into the well-known DICE-2016R 
model by William Nordhaus (2018). Using the resulting model variant DICE-RD, 
we analyze the potential welfare effects caused by the rate of temperature increase 
for several scenarios. Each scenario compares the net output stemming from the 
optimal climate policy with the net output resulting from the reference policy that 
ignores rate-related damages. The differences in net output then can be interpreted 
as the economic losses that occur if rate-related damages are neglected.
The present paper proceeds as follows. Section  2 illustrates the importance of 
rate-related damages by several examples from the literature. In Sect. 3, we justify 
the use of DICE-2016R, summarize the main criticisms of this model and compare 
it to other IAMs with special reference to the integration of rate-related damages. 
In Sect.  4, we shortly outline those parts of DICE-2016R that are important for 
our analysis, and in Sect.  5, we incorporate rate-related damages into the model. 
In Sect. 6, we discuss the results of our base scenario, and in Sect. 7, we present a 
comprehensive sensitivity analysis. In Sect. 8, we consider the case of a fixed tem-
perature target, and in Sect. 9, we summarize our findings and highlight the need for 
further research.
2  Impacts of the rate of temperature increase
The harmful impacts caused by a high rate of temperature increase are best under-
stood in the field of ecosystems and biodiversity (for an overview of studies, see 
Warren et al. 2011). Several species of flora and fauna are endangered by displace-
ment or even complete extinction when the temperature increases faster than they 
are able to adapt (e.g., Neilson et  al. 2005, O’Neill et  al. 2017, Millington et  al. 
2019). This adaptation might be a migration to new habitats with more suitable con-
ditions,2 or a change in the distribution of phenotypes within a given species toward 
1 See Tahvonen (1995) for an early analytical treatment of the implications for optimal mitigation with 
a short empirical application based on a modified static precursor of the DICE model (Nordhaus 1991).
2 I.e., moving pole-wards or moving to higher altitudes in case of increasing temperatures (e.g., Loarie 
et  al. 2009). However, as Malcolm et  al. (2002) point out, the current rates of temperature increase 
require migration rates that are much faster than those observed during the complete postglacial period.
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the better-adapted ones (e.g., Visser 2008, Corlett and Westcott 2013, Christmas 
et  al. 2016). The capability of species to adapt by migration or genetic evolution, 
however, naturally depends on how fast the climate is changing. Hence, rates of tem-
perature increase that exceed a certain threshold will reduce biodiversity by select-
ing highly mobile or opportunistic species (Malcolm et al. 2002).
In particular, according to Leemans and Eickhout (2004), the adaptive capacity 
of forest ecosystems is much lower than the one of other ecosystems.3 This is of 
considerable importance for the future trend of climate change, since the decompo-
sition processes associated with a large-scale dieback of forests could lead to huge 
releases of  CO2 from the terrestrial biosphere, thereby producing a significant feed-
back mechanism that accelerates global warming (e.g., Neilson 1993, Kirschbaum 
2000, Cox et al. 2004, Bhatti et al. 2012, Price et al. 2013).
Acceptable thresholds for the rate of temperature increase, where the adaptive 
capacity of most species and ecosystems can cope with climate change, have been 
studied for almost 30  years. Early estimates suggest a “tolerable window” of not 
more than 0.1 °C per decade (Vellinga and Swart 1991). More recent studies come 
to similar conclusions ranging from 0.05  °C per decade (van Vliet and Leemans 
2006) to 0.2 °C per decade (Petschel-Held et al. 1999; Leemans and Eickhout 2004). 
In contrast, assuming “business as usual” conditions, Nordhaus (2018) calculates a 
temperature trajectory that implies a peak level of almost 0.4 °C per decade around 
the middle of this century (for details see Sect. 5).
Besides ecosystems and biodiversity, the rate of temperature increase has impacts 
on several direct economic activities. The most obvious one is agriculture, which 
heavily depends on ecosystem services that are partially endangered if temperature 
rises too fast.4 Moreover, global warming requires the adaptation of agricultural 
practices to changing environmental conditions. This requires not only short-term 
measures like the switch to crops with higher resistance to heat shocks and drought, 
but also the long-term building of appropriate institutions and infrastructure that 
enhance adaptive capacity in the agricultural sector (e.g., Lobell et al. 2008, Rick-
ards and Howden 2012). However, the faster the climate change occurs, the less 
likely it is that these measures can be established in time.5
In forestry, the impacts of the rate of temperature increase are evident regarding 
commercially used tree species. These are affected by climate change, because suit-
able regions move pole-wards due to global warming. When the rate of temperature 
increase is too fast, the species’ population will decline on the whole because the 
natural rate of migration to suitable regions cannot cope with the pace of climate 
change. Consequently, in forestry, proper migration to new habitats needs to be com-
mercially assisted (Zhu et al. 2012; Pedlar et al. 2012). According to Howden et al. 
3 E.g., at a rate of temperature increase of 0.3 °C per decade, 30% of all impacted ecosystems are still 
able to adapt within a century, but only 17% of all impacted forests (Leemans and Eickhout 2004).
4 These services include, among others, pollination and nutrient cycling. On their importance for agri-
culture, see, e.g., Zhang et al. 2007, Brady et al. 2015 and Bommarco et al. 2017.
5 Due to low adaptive capacities, these problems are particularly virulent in developing countries and in 
the subsistence farming sector (e.g., Bellon et al. 2011, Tambo and Aboulaye 2012, 2013).
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(2007), a closely related problem is the long time lags between planting and harvest-
ing, which makes it difficult to adapt properly to rapidly rising temperatures. As a 
consequence, timber companies might be forced to a premature harvest of trees that 
are no longer able to keep up with the changed climatic conditions (Mendelsohn 
2000).
Moreover, although specific literature on this topic is still scarce, several other 
sectors are potentially affected by the rate of temperature increase. As emphasized 
by Mendelsohn (2000), sectors that are burdened with long-lived capital which can-
not readily be fitted to changing climate conditions are particularly vulnerable, since 
they might be forced to depreciate capital more rapidly than normal. An example 
might be the premature close-down of a hydroelectric power station due to water 
shortage. In addition, the adaptation of human systems to climate change often pre-
supposes huge time-consuming investments in knowledge, institutions and infra-
structure that “can take decades” as stressed by Patt et al. (2010, p. 392).6 Prominent 
examples are adaptive investments in the fields of coastal protection (e.g., Shayegh 
et al. 2016) and the development of new vaccines and vaccination schemes against 
infectious diseases that spread faster as temperatures rise (e.g., Kurane 2010). A 
high rate of temperature increase entails the danger that these measures cannot keep 
up with the speed of warming.7
Another issue within the present context are so-called “tipping points” where cli-
matic conditions change abruptly, irreversibly and in a hardly predictable manner. 
Examples are the shutoff of the thermohaline circulation (e.g., Latif et al. 2006) or 
the collapse of the Indian summer monsoon (e.g., Zickfeld et al. 2005). According 
to Lenton et al. (2008) and Lenton (2011), the risks of passing such tipping points 
can directly be attributed to the rate of temperature increase. However, the issue of 
tipping points will be neglected in the following analysis, because the rates of tem-
perature increase that entail the danger of passing a tipping point are far above those 
that cause the problems discussed in the present section.
3  The use of DICE‑2016R for analyzing the impacts of rate‑related 
damages
The damage function of DICE-2016R, as well as those of most other IAMs, relies 
exclusively on the absolute level of temperature increase. However, as substantiated 
in the last section, the rate of temperature increase is an important driver of damages 
as well. When the first generation of IAMs came up in the early 1990s, this issue 
had been discussed, but with the exceptions described below, the damage functions 
employed in IAMs do not account for rate-related damages.
6 For a detailed overview of adaptation measures and the barriers to them see IPCC (2014a, Chapter 16).
7 According to the IPCC (2014b, chapter 28), this problem is particularly pressing in the Polar regions 
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The earliest exception traces back to the work of Peck and Teisberg (1994). 
The authors compare the results of their original CETA model, where damages 
are driven by the absolute level of temperature, with those of a modified version 
where damages depend on the rate of temperature increase. Their main finding is 
that optimal mitigation rates rather hinge on the shape of the damage function (e.g., 
quadratic or cubic) than on the question whether the absolute level or the rate of 
temperature increase is considered. The modified damage function used by Peck 
and Teisberg (1994), however, does not account for both variables at the same time. 
Consequently, the authors do not analyze the joint effects of both damage categories. 
Moreover, today the CETA model, which dates back to the early 1990s, is outdated 
in its parameterization.
Another IAM that partially accounts for rate-related damages is the FUND model 
(Tol 1997; Tol and Anthoff 2014). In this approach, however, only the impacts 
on agriculture depend on the absolute level as well as on the rate of temperature 
increase, whereas the impacts on all other sectors are modeled in the conventional 
way. Moreover, FUND exhibits only a limited degree of endogeneity, since produc-
tion activities and the resulting emissions follow exogenous trajectories. Conse-
quently, in contrast to DICE, it is not possible to derive a complete first-best solution 
including the optimal level of production.
Also, the PAGE model (Hope 2006, 2013) accounts to some extent for rate-
related damages. This model, however, is a probabilistic simulation model that 
mainly serves to analyze the impacts of uncertainty. The degree of endogeneity is 
even lower than in FUND, because not only production but also mitigation rates are 
exogenous. Hence, within PAGE it is not possible to investigate the impact of rate-
related damages on optimal climate policies.8
The most recent contribution is the work of Goes et al. (2011) who analyze the 
effects of aerosol geoengineering within the DICE-2007 model. Since the injection 
of aerosols into the atmosphere can lead to very fast changes in temperature, the 
authors use a modified damage function based on the rate of temperature increase 
in terms of 5-year and 30-year running averages. However, the focus of Goes et al. 
(2011) is solely on the effects of geoengineering. Their general approach as well as 
their damage function is not designed to investigate the role of rate-related damages 
in determining optimal climate policies.
Besides the small-scale IAMs described so far, there exists a whole range of more 
complex large-scale IAMs used by, e.g., the IPCC to simulate alternative emission 
pathways that aim at limiting the increase in global mean temperature to a certain 
degree (IPCC 2014c).9 These models usually combine a detailed representation of 
the energy sector with an extensive model of the global carbon cycle that trans-
lates the emissions from the energy system into the resulting temperature change. 
8 For a more thorough comparison between DICE, FUND and PAGE, see, e.g., Mastrandrea (2009), 
Stanton et al. (2009) and van Vuuren et al. (2011a).
9 According to IPCC (1996), these models can also be classified as policy-evaluation models (in con-
trast to policy-optimization models). Examples of the most widely used large-scale IAMs are IMAGE 
(Stehfest et al. 2014), AIM/CGE (Fujimori et al. 2012) and MESSAGE (Krey et al. 2016). For a critical 
overview see, e.g., Wilson et al. (2017) or Gambhir et al. (2019).
560 Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2020) 22:555–584
1 3
However, in contrast to small-scale IAMs, impacts on the economy caused by cli-
mate change are largely neglected (e.g., Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013, IPCC, 2014b, 
Farmer et al. 2015). As far as large-scale IAMs consider climate impacts at all, they 
are limited to single sectors such as, e.g., agriculture or water supply (for an over-
view, see Weyant 2017, pp. 120–121). Hence, due to an incomplete coverage of 
impacts, large-scale IAMs are not well suited to analyze the overall economic effects 
of rate-related damages. Moreover, the rate of temperature increase is considered in 
these models only to the extent that some of them have been used to analyze how 
mitigation costs change if not only the absolute increase in temperature, but also its 
rate is to be limited (e.g., Toth et al. 2003, Böhringer et al. 2006).
To our best knowledge, the DICE model is the most appropriate approach for 
the topic of our paper. Since the development of the first version (Nordhaus 1994), 
DICE has probably become the most popular small-scale IAM in the economics of 
climate change. In the “business as usual” scenario of DICE-2016R that relies on an 
indefinite extension of climate policies as of 2010, the resulting temperature trajec-
tory is essentially consistent with the RCP 8.5-scenario derived by the IPCC from 
a set of large-scale IAMs (Nordhaus 2018).10 Moreover, the code of the model is 
publicly available,11 and due to its comparatively simple structure, it offers a high 
degree of transparency, whereas the more complex large-scale IAMs partially can be 
viewed as “black box” models (Gambhir et al. 2019). Finally, due to its popularity, 
DICE entails the advantage that our results are comparable with those of many other 
studies using the same model family.
Of course, we are aware of the harsh criticisms in the literature on the DICE 
model and partially also on IAMs in general.12 At the heart of these criticisms is 
often the damage function which has huge effects on the results, and at the same time 
can be considered as the “most speculative element of the analysis” (Pindyck 2013, 
p. 862). Within this context, some of the most critical issues relate to uncertainty 
often coupled with tipping points and potential catastrophes (e.g., Stern 2013, Burke 
et al. 2015a, 2018), as well as to the insufficient treatment of non-market impacts. 
The latter range from well-studied effects like ecosystem damages13 to less-known 
13 Note that in the DICE model, all damages are measured as losses in GDP. Concerning ecosystem 
damages (which are of particular importance for our study), this approach might seem odd, since eco-
system damages regularly do not show up directly in the GDP. However, there are many instances where 
these damages indirectly reduce the GDP. For example, coastal degradation can amplify the damages 
caused by flooding and the extinction of insects can affect the productivity in agriculture (for a compre-
hensive overview see IPCC 2014a).
10 The abbreviation RCP refers to the four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP2.6, RCP4.5, 
RCP6, RCP8.5) used by, e.g., the IPPC for modeling climate change. The pathway RCP 8.5 describes the 
likely outcome of a “business as usual” scenario where radiative forcing is estimated to increases up to 
8.5 Watt/m2 by the year 2100 (e.g., van Vuuren et al. 2011b).
11 The source code of DICE-2016R can be downloaded at https ://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordh aus/homep 
age/homep age/DICE2 016R-09191 6ap.gms. Last access at 30/01/2020.
12 Due to limited space, we can only provide a cursory and incomplete summary. For a thorough discus-
sion see the literature cited above as well as Ackerman et al. (2009), Stanton et al. (2009), Howard and 
Sterner (2017), Pindyck (2017), NASEM (2017) and Weyant (2017).
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areas like the linkage between climate change and increasing human conflicts (e.g., 
Hsiang and Burke 2014, Burke et al. 2015b).
A critical issue upstream of the damage function is the veil of uncertainty sur-
rounding the “climate sensitivity” which constitutes the link between the atmos-
pheric  CO2 concentration and the accompanying increase in global mean tempera-
ture (e.g., Weitzman 2011).14 Further controversially discussed issues relate to the 
crucial role of discounting (e.g., Stern 2007, Dasgupta 2008, Goulder and Williams 
2012, Arrow et al. 2014, Heal and Millner 2014) and to the maximization of a sin-
gle global welfare function that omits considerations of regional equity in particular 
with respect to developing countries (e.g., Stanton and Ackerman 2009).
Finally, several criticisms relate to technological aspects. For example, despite 
the well-known insights from the literature on endogenous technological change 
(Romer 1990), in the DICE model technical progress with respect to the total factor 
productivity, to mitigation costs and to the decarbonization of production follows 
exogenously given trends in time (e.g., Farmer et al. 2015). Moreover, as pointed out 
by Grubb et al. (2014, p. 496), the mitigation cost function “involves no history” as 
“the cost of cutting emissions in 2010, for example, is wholly unaffected by anything 
that happens before”. In practice, however, emissions mitigation requires a restruc-
turing of the capital stock such that a sharp increase in mitigation rates between 
two periods would involve extra costs for, e.g., the premature replacement of power 
plants. Due to these and other limitations of the DICE model, the results derived 
in the following sections can at best be considered as rough estimates and must be 
interpreted with caution.
4  The DICE‑2016R model
In the following, we describe only those parts of the DICE-2016R model that are 
important for our analysis.15 Utility is expressed by a standard constant-relative-risk-
aversion utility function:
The time index t indicates the specific period, c(t) is per capita consumption, L(t) 
is the population and α is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption which is 
set at 1.45. The objective function to be maximized is the welfare function W. The 
latter consists of the discounted utility summed up over a finite time horizon of 100 
periods each covering 5 years:






14 At the benchmark of a doubled  CO2 concentration compared to pre-industrial levels, DICE-2016R 
assumes an increase in temperature of 3.1 °C, whereas the IPCC (2013) estimates a likely range of 1.5 °C 
to 4.5°, but larger magnitudes up to 6 °C can also not be ruled out completely.
15 For more details on DICE-2016R, see Nordhaus (2018). A thorough description of the almost identi-
cal model DICE-2013R is provided by Nordhaus and Sztorc (2013).
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The parameter ρ indicates the pure rate of social time preference, which is set 
at 1.5%. The production function is of Cobb–Douglas type Y(t) = A(t)K(t)L(t)1− 
with Y(t) indicating gross output. A(t) is the total factor productivity, K(t) is the 
capital stock and L(t) is not only the population but also the labor input and γ is 
the elasticity of output with respect to the capital.
The link to the climate module is formed via greenhouse gas emissions E(t) 
that are composed of industrial emissions and exogenously given emissions 
resulting from non-industrial activities (e.g., land use changes) denoted by 
ELand(t) . Industrial emissions are caused by production due to an exogenous emis-
sion coefficient σ(t) which declines over time. The share μ(t) of these emissions is 
avoided by mitigation activities such that total emissions are given by:
The accumulation of emissions leads to a higher atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentration that causes an increase in radiative forcing. In the next step, the 
increased radiative forcing triggers a higher level of temperature. The economic 
impact of this temperature increase is given by a quadratic damage function D(t), 
which describes the share of output lost due to climate damages:
TAT(t) indicates the increase in the global atmospheric mean temperature com-
pared to the pre-industrial level, and the parameters i(i = 1, 2) determine the 
shape of the damage function.
With respect to (4), the question might arise whether the function D[TAT(t)] 
does not already take into account rate-related damages. Of course, any 
absolute temperature increase TAT(t) can be decomposed into a sequence 




ΔTAT(t) ∶= TAT(t) − TAT(t − 1) . In this sense, it could be argued that (4) already 
considers the changes in temperature that occurred between two successive peri-
ods. However, there is no explicit consideration of the additional damages caused 
by the current rate of temperature increase. For example, a temperature com-
pared to pre-industrial levels of TAT(t) = 1.2 leads to the same damage in period 
t  , regardless of whether the temperature in the previous period t − 1 was, say, 
TAT(t − 1) = 1.1 or TAT(t − 1) = 0.8.
Next, the mitigation cost function Λ(t) is defined in terms of the share of out-
put spent for mitigation activities:
The variable μ(t) indicates the mitigation rate (i.e., the share of emissions 









(3)E(t) = [1 − (t)](t)Y(t) + ELand(t).
(4)D(t) = 1 ⋅ TAT(t) + 2 ⋅ TAT(t)2.
(5)Λ(t) = 1 ⋅ (t)2 .
563
1 3
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2020) 22:555–584 
Subtracting damages and mitigation costs from the gross output Y(t) yields the 
remaining net output Ynet(t) = [1 − D(t) − Λ(t)]Y(t) to be divided into consumption 
and investment. The latter equation highlights the typical trade-off in climate poli-
cies: emission mitigation leads to mitigation costs Λ(t) resulting in a decreasing net 
output. However, at the same time, emission mitigation reduces damages D(t) result-
ing in an increasing net output. To solve the model, the mitigation rates μ(t) and the 
division of net output between consumption C(t) and investments I(t) are determined 
in such a way that the objective function (2) is maximized.
Finally, it should be noted that the maximization approach underlying the DICE 
model implicitly assumes the existence of a benevolent social planner who is able to 
calculate and enforce the optimal climate policy. Within a competitive market econ-
omy, however, the optimum could be decentralized by introducing a harmonized 
global carbon tax that equals the social cost of carbon calculated along the optimal 
emission pathway.16 Although such a scenario of global cooperation is far from real-
ity, it provides a useful efficiency benchmark for evaluating more realistic policy 
options (Nordhaus and Sztorc 2013).
5  From DICE‑2016R to DICE‑RD
To transform DICE-2016R into DICE-RD, we have to modify the damage function 
(4). The new function should incorporate the absolute level as well as the rate of 
temperature increase as a driver of damages. Moreover, it should account for the 
threshold dependency of rate-related damages. Both requirements can be satisfied 
via replacing the original damage function D(t) by the new damage function Z(t):
The term in square brackets on the RHS of (6) represents the original dam-
age function D(t) and the multiplier (t) ≥ 1 accounts for the effect of rate-related 
damages.17 The latter depend on the rate of temperature increase defined as 
ΔTAT(t) ∶= TAT(t) − TAT(t − 1):
The parameters  and  govern the shape of the multiplier function (t) , and  
indicates the critical threshold for the rate of temperature increase measured in °C 
per decade. Since each period of DICE-2016R covers only 5 years, we have to use 
an internal threshold of 0.5 in our model. The damage parameter  is calibrated in 
(6)Z(t) ∶= [1 ⋅ TAT(t) + 2 ⋅ TAT(t)2] ⋅ (t).









16 The social cost of carbon measure “the present value of additional economic damages now and in the 
future caused by an additional ton of carbon emissions” (Nordhaus 2008, p. 11).
17 We assume a multiplicative instead of an additive relationship between both types of damages, 
because systems that are already disturbed by the absolute level of temperature increase will probably 
have more problems coping with the additional stress caused by a high rate of temperature increase.
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such a way that it indicates the percentage increase in total damages if the increase 
in temperature between two periods is twice as high as the internal threshold, i.e., 
ΔTAT(t) =  . Moreover, according to the binary variable B(t) defined below in (8), 
rate-related damages only occur if the rate of temperature increase between two 
periods exceeds the internal threshold of 0.5 . Otherwise, we obtain a multiplier of 
(t) = 1 and the new damage function Z(t) equals the original one D(t):
As an example, Fig. 1 illustrates the shape of the damage multiplier (t) for the 
case of  = 0.1 ,  = 2 and varying magnitudes of the parameter .18
In our base scenario in Sect.  6, we employ the best guess threshold of 0.1  °C 
per decade, i.e.,  = 0.1 . In contrast to this more or less reliable figure (see Sect. 2), 
the range of the parameters  and  is almost completely uncertain. At the present 
state of insights from the social and natural sciences, we can only conclude that  
should be strictly positive, and  should be larger than one, since rate-related dam-
ages are expected to increase more than proportionately when the rate of tempera-
ture increase becomes larger (e.g., Leemans and Eickhout 2004). Our base scenario 
assumes a quadratic shape of the multiplier function, i.e.,  = 2 . Moreover, to avoid 
overestimating rate-related damages, we assume in the base scenario that damages 
increase only by moderate 2.5% if the rate of temperature increase is twice as high 
as the critical threshold, i.e.  = 2.5.
To put these assumptions into perspective, let us take for the moment the (not 
entirely correct) assumption that damages caused by the rate of temperature increase 
can be completely attributed to ecosystems and agriculture, which are presumably 
(8)B(t) ∶=
{
0 if ΔTAT(t) ≤ 0.5𝜈
1 if ΔTAT(t) > 0.5𝜈
.
18 As pointed out by two of the reviewers, different species, ecosystems and economic activities are sub-
ject to different critical thresholds. Hence, the multiplier function should rather have a partial staircase 
curvature with convex segments. Such an approach, however, would not only exacerbate the problem of 
finding suitable empirical data, but also tremendously increase the need for computational capacity. We 
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the two most affected fields. According to Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), these two 
fields account for about 15–20% of total damages caused by climate change. Hence, 
an increase in total damages by 2.5%, as assumed in our base scenario for a warming 
of 0.2 °C per decade, would imply that the damages to ecosystems and agriculture 
increase by 12.5–16.6%.
To further illustrate the possible consequence of the assumptions used in our base 
scenario, it is useful to apply them to the “business as usual” case of DICE-2016R 
that relies on an indefinite extension of climate policies as in the year 2010. In this 
case, global mean temperature rises rapidly and would reach + 5  °C compared to 
pre-industrial levels already by the year 2120. As a consequence, the threshold of 
0.1 °C/decade is heavily violated and the damage parameter (t) rises to a peak level 
of more than 1.22 (see Table 1).19 Calculated over the whole time horizon, the losses 
in the present value of net output caused by rate-related damages amount to about 
51 trillion 2005 US-$ or 0.74% in relative terms.20 Hence, even under the moderate 
assumptions of our base scenario, the extent of rate-related damages can become 
substantial if climate policies do not go beyond the status of 2010.
Regarding the possibilities of reducing rate-related damages, however, it should 
be recognized that due to the inertia of the climate system and the longevity of  CO2, 
there is already a “committed level of future warming” caused by past emissions 
(e.g., Frölicher et al. 2014). To illustrate the possible implications of this observa-
tion, we also analyzed an “immediate stop” case in DICE-2016R assuming that the 
mitigation rates are 100% already from the year 2015 (and that in 2150 they would 
jump to 120% as in the original model).21 As indicated in Table 1, this leads to a 
sharp decline in the rates of temperature increase, but under the assumptions of our 
base scenario there will inevitably be some degree of rate-related damages during 
the first decades.
19 Figures 11 and 12 in the Appendix show the evolution of greenhouse gas emissions and the accompa-
nying temperature trajectory for the scenarios displayed in Table 1.
20 These results have been calculated by running DICE-RD with the mitigation rates fixed to the “busi-
ness as usual”-levels of DICE-2016R.
21 To isolate the pure level of committed future warming, in this scenario we also fix the exogenous  CO2 
emissions from non-industrial activities to zero.
Table 1  Rate of temperature increase and magnitude of damage multiplier (t) in the “Business as 
usual”- and the “Immediate stop” case of DICE-2016R
The calculation of the damage multiplier relies on the assumptions of our base scenario
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120
Rate of temperature increase [°C/decade]
 Business as usual 0.3392 0.3803 0.3995 0.3976 0.3761 0.3280
 Immediate stop 0.3019 0.1663 0.1091 0.0807 0.0624 0.0356
Magnitude of damage multiplier δ(t)
 Business as usual 1.1510 1.2018 1.2258 1.2194 1.1823 1.1236
 Immediate stop 1.0760 1.0078 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
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Finally, we note that we are aware of the poor empirical foundation of our approach. 
The objective of the present study, however, is not an exact quantification of the 
impacts of rate-related damages. Rather, we want to elucidate the essential mecha-
nisms, to describe possible scenarios and to narrow the range of likely outcomes by 
means of a comprehensive sensitivity analysis that covers a wide range of parameters.
6  Results for the base scenario
In this section, we discuss the results calculated using our modified model DICE-RD 
and compare them to the results of the original DICE-2016R model.22 As usual in stud-
ies based on DICE, we consider only the results for the first 200 years, although both 
models cover a time horizon of 500 years in total.23 The major endogenous policy vari-
able is the mitigation rate μ(t) that describes the share of emissions avoided. For conveni-
ence, in the text mitigation rates are expressed as percentages, although in the original 
GAMS-files as well as in the figures below the variables μ(t) are expressed as decimals.
The left-hand scale of Fig. 2 indicates the optimal mitigation rates resulting from 
the original DICE-2016R model as calculated by Nordhaus (2018). For the first 
period, the mitigation rate is exogenously fixed. The first endogenously optimized 
mitigation rate occurs in 2015 with roughly 19%. From that point on, the mitigation 
rates rise steadily until they reach their temporary upper limit of 100% in 2110. Sub-
sequently, in 2150 the mitigation rates jump to 120%, since the upper limit is relaxed 





















































































Fig. 2  Optimal mitigation rates. Left-hand scale: DICE-2016R. Right-hand scale: Differences between 
DICE-RD and DICE-2016R
24 At present, one of the most promising technologies in development is the combination of bioenergy 
with carbon capture and storage (e.g., Azar et al. 2013, Fridahl and Lehtveer 2018). However, as empha-
sized by Anderson and Peters (2016), the tempting prospect that such technologies will become available 
on a large scale entails the danger that near-term mitigation measures are neglected.
22 All calculations have been performed using the GAMS-software version win64/24.1 with the BON-
MIN solver. The latter is capable of solving mixed integer problems, which is necessary due to the use of 
a binary variable. The program files are available from the corresponding author on request.
23 Considering a longer time span would even reinforce our results, since the vast majority of economic 
losses caused by neglecting rate-related damages occur not before the next century.
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The right-hand scale of Fig. 2 indicates the results of our own calculations using 
DICE-RD with the base assumptions  = 2.5 ,  = 2 and  = 0.1 . To enhance the 
graphical depiction, we do not display the absolute mitigation rates, but their dif-
ferences to the original mitigation rates resulting from DICE-2016R. As shown in 
Fig. 2, these differences increase steadily until they reach a peak level of almost six 
percentage points around the year 2070. Afterward, they converge back to zero in 
2110. The reason for the latter behavior is straightforward, since in 2110 the mitiga-
tion rates in both models reach their limit of 100% such that no more differences 
occur.
Moreover, Figs. 11 and 12 in the Appendix show the evolution of greenhouse gas 
emissions and the accompanying temperature trajectory resulting from DICE-2016R 
and DICE-RD. In both models, the time path of emissions and global mean temper-
ature exhibit the same shape. After a period of increase driven by economic growth, 
emissions start to decrease around the year 2040, tend to zero in 2110 and become 
negative in 2150. Due to the inertia of the climate systems, global mean temperature 
continues to increase until 2165 and starts to decrease afterward. However, in DICE-
RD emissions are significantly lower than in DICE-2016R and the rise in tempera-
ture is slightly slowed down. Although the threshold of 0.1 °C per decade is violated 
in both models during the first 120 years, the rate of temperature increase and the 
accompanying damage multiplier (t) are lower in DICE-RD than in DICE-2016R 
(see Table 2).
At first glance, the differences between DICE-2016R and DICE-RD shown in 
Table 2 might seem to be almost negligible, since only a small part of rate-related 
damages is avoided. However, as the following analysis will show, the economic 
losses caused by neglecting rate-related damages can be significant. The calculation 
of these losses is performed in three steps25:
–In the first step, we calculate the net output that results if the optimal mitigation 
rates as derived from DICE-RD are employed.
25 In Wirths et  al. (2018), we use a similar calculation to quantify the economic losses caused by 
neglecting the permafrost carbon feedback in the determination of optimal mitigation.
Table 2  Rate of temperature increase and magnitude of damage multiplier (t) in the optima of DICE-
2016R and DICE-RD
The calculation of the damage multiplier relies on the assumptions of our base scenario
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120
Rate of temperature increase [°C/decade]
 DICE-2016R 0.3343 0.3405 0.3249 0.2826 0.2150 0.1157
 DICE-RD 0.3337 0.3350 0.3136 0.2672 0.1983 0.1063
Magnitude of damage multiplier δ(t)
 DICE-2016R 1.1372 1.1450 1.1265 1.0842 1.0330 1.0006
 DICE-RD 1.1366 1.1381 1.1141 1.0700 1.0242 1.0001
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–In the second step, we run DICE-RD with exogenous mitigation rates that are 
fixed to the levels resulting from the original model DICE-2016R as shown at the 
left-hand scale of Fig. 2. Hence, for roughly the first 100 years, we force DICE-
RD to employ suboptimal low rates. This yields the net output that results if the 
applied mitigation rates neglect rate-related damages, although they are present in 
the model.
–In the third step, the differences in net output between the optimal run (first step) 
and the run with fixed mitigation rates (second step) are calculated. The present 
value of these differences can be interpreted as the economic losses caused by a 
climate policy that neglects rate-related damages.26
The results of this comparison in discounted trillions of 2005 US-$ per year are 
shown in Fig. 3.27 Remarkably, the output losses for roughly the first 70 years are 
negative. This implies that actually the suboptimal climate policy, which ignores 
rate-related damages, is economically beneficial in those periods. The reason is 
obvious, since the optimal climate policy requires higher mitigation rates. This leads 
immediately to higher mitigation costs, whereas the majority of the benefits in terms 
of a lower increase in temperature accrue in the distant future. Consequently, when 
considering only the first couple of periods, employing suboptimal low mitigation 
rates leads to an increase in net output. Around the year 2080, however, this situ-
ation would change drastically. The output losses caused by ignoring rate-related 
damages become positive and increase sharply. The reason is that the optimal mit-
igation rates converge to the original rates resulting from DICE-2016R as shown 
in Fig. 2. Hence, in the following decades, the additional mitigation costs implied 
26 For discounting, we use the real interest rates resulting from DICE-2016R. These rates are declining 
in time: they range from 5.1% p.a. for the first period to 2.8% p.a. for the last period of the time horizon 
considered.
27 The same calculation can be performed for the variables consumption and investments. Apart from 







































































Fig. 3  Discounted losses in net output if rate-related damages are ignored (base scenario)
569
1 3
Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2020) 22:555–584 
by the optimal climate policy tend to zero, but the economy still benefits from less 
damage due to the increased mitigation rates in the past. Aggregated over the com-
plete time horizon, the present value of losses in net output amounts to 5.3 trillion 
2005 US-$. Compared to the present value of aggregated net output in the optimum 
of DICE-RD, this implies relative losses of only about 0.08%. However, since most 
of the output losses occur in the distant future, this figure might be biased by dis-
counting (see also Sect. 7.2).
In terms of intergenerational equity, our results imply that present generations liv-
ing until 2080 would benefit from neglecting rate-related damages, whereas future 
generations living afterward will have to bear a high additional burden. In terms of 
present value, the output losses accumulated after 2080 are about 7.5 times as high 
as the growth in output generated in the time span before. Hence, the intergenera-
tional conflict caused by climate change is exacerbated even further.
7  Sensitivity analysis
As a general shortcoming, the results of IAMs like DICE crucially depend on the 
magnitude of several parameters, which are highly uncertain or at least disputed in 
the literature (see Sect.  3). The need to fix the parameters of our multiplier func-
tion (7) adds even more uncertainty to the model, since the extent to which the rate 
of temperature increase affects ecological and social systems is poorly understood. 
Therefore, in Sect. 7.1, we analyze the effects caused by varying the parameters of 
the multiplier function.
Moreover, one of the most important—but also most controversially discussed—
parameters influencing optimal mitigation is the pure rate of social time preference. 
Concerning the issue under consideration, the effects of discounting might even be 
stronger, since the output losses caused by neglecting rate-related damages mainly 
occur in the distant future. Consequently, the effects of varying the pure rate of 
social time preference are analyzed in Sect. 7.2.
7.1  Parameters of the multiplier function
As already emphasized in Sect. 5, the parameter  describes the percentage by which 
total damages increase if the rate of temperature increase is twice as high as the 
critical threshold. In our base scenario, we assumed  = 2.5 . Now, we consider two 
additional cases: A “low damage” scenario with  = 1 and a “high damage” scenario 
with  = 5 . As expected, an increase in  reinforces the differences in mitigation 
rates, whereas a decrease in  causes the opposite effect (see Fig. 4). However, even 
in the “low damage” scenario we still obtain non-negligible differences that peak at 
about 2.5 percentage points around 2070.
For all three scenarios, the discounted losses in net output caused by ignoring 
rate-related damages follow the same general trend (see Fig. 5): At the beginning of 
570 Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2020) 22:555–584
1 3
the time horizon, they are slightly negative, but later on, they become positive and 
start to increase more or less sharply. The only difference relates to their absolute 
levels: in the “high damage” scenario the present value of aggregated losses in net 
output increases up to 11.2  trillion US-$ implying relative losses of about 0.17%. 
In the “low damage” scenario, the present value of losses shrinks down to 2 trillion 
US-$ or about 0.03%, respectively.
Next, we turn to the effects of changing the parameter  that determines the con-
vexity of the multiplier function (t) . In addition to the quadratic case with  = 2 
considered above, we analyze a linear specification  = 1 and a cubic specification 
 = 3.28 Compared to the quadratic specification, the linear one implies that rates of 
temperature increase below the calibration point of 0.1 °C per period lead to higher 
damages, whereas rates above 0.1 °C per period lead to lower damages. The oppo-
site effects occur when switching from the quadratic to the cubic specification. The 
results of these calculations are shown in Figs. 13 and 14 in the Appendix. Except 
for a short time span around 2090–2110, increasing or decreasing the parameter  
has essentially the same effects as increasing or decreasing  (albeit the absolute 
magnitude of the effects is different). Using the cubic instead of the quadratic speci-
fication increases the relative losses in the present value of net output from 0.08% 
up to 0.22%, whereas using the linear specification we obtain a decline to roughly 
0.03%.
Finally, we analyze changes in the critical threshold for rate-related damages. 
Proceeding from the magnitude of 0.1  °C/decade assumed so far, we consider a 
less severe threshold of 0.2 °C/decade and a more severe one of 0.05 °C/decade as 
suggested by the literature (see Sect. 2). For both cases, we again assume  = 2.5 
and the quadratic specification  = 2 . Figures 15 and 16 in the Appendix show the 
results of these calculations. Assuming the less severe threshold of 0.2 °C/decade, 


































































Fig. 4  Optimal mitigation rates: differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for varying damage 
parameters  (assuming  = 2 and  = 0.1)
28 We are aware that the linear specification is a limiting case that is actually unrealistic in view of the 
present state of knowledge (see section 5).
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solution of the original DICE-2016R violates this threshold only slightly during the 
first couple of periods. In contrast, for a threshold of 0.05 °C/decade, the differences 
in mitigation rates almost quadruple compared to the base scenario. Consequently, 
the losses in the present value of net output increase up to 37 trillion US-$ implying 
relative losses of about 0.57%. These results show that the economic effects of rate-
related damages react rather sensitively to changes in the critical threshold.
Figure 6 summarizes the results from our sensitivity analysis in terms of the rela-
tive losses in the present value of net output caused by ignoring rate-related dam-
ages. Overall, these results suggest that potential economic impacts of rate-related 
damages range from almost negligible 0.03% to a more substantial 0.57%.
The variations considered in the sensitivity analysis above, however, can also 
occur simultaneously thereby reinforcing each other. Hence, to illustrate the pos-
sible extent of the problem at hand, we additionally calculated a “worst case” 
scenario that combines the most critical assumptions. In detail, we assumed that 
the multiplier function (t) is cubic, the threshold for the occurrence of rate-


































































r] λ=1     λ=2.5     λ=5
Fig. 5  Discounted losses in net output for varying damage parameters  (assuming  = 2 and  = 0.1)
Fig. 6  Summary of sensitivity analysis: Relative losses in present value of net output [%]
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5% if the rate of temperature increase is twice as high as the critical threshold. 
As a result, we found that the differences in mitigation rates would rise to a peak 
level of about 48 percentage points already around 2040, and the losses in the 
present value of net output amount to 485  trillion US-$ or about 7.6%, respec-
tively. Hence, under”worst case” assumptions, which cannot be ruled out com-
pletely at the present state of knowledge, rate-related damages can lead to serious 
economic losses.
7.2  Pure rate of social time preference
In the following, we again refer to the base scenario with  = 2.5 ,  = 2 and a 
threshold of 0.1 °C per decade, but now we consider the impacts caused by reduc-
ing the pure rate of social time preference  from 1.5% (as used so far) to 1% and 
0.5%. Of course, to guarantee comparability, the lower values of ρ are employed 
in our extended model DICE-RD as well as in the original model DICE-2016R. In 
both models, decreasing ρ causes the mitigation rates to increase more rapidly, since 
future climate damages gain more weight against early mitigation costs. In DICE-
2016R, however, these effects are stronger than in DICE-RD. Consequently, lower-
ing the rate of social time preference diminishes the differences in mitigation rates 
(see Fig. 7). Moreover, the smaller the  , the earlier the mitigation rates approach 
their upper limit of 100% such that differences converge back to zero.
Of course, the diminishing differences in mitigation rates have a strong impact 
on the losses in net output caused by neglecting rate-related damages. The abso-
lute (i.e., undiscounted) losses behave as expected and decline by roughly 50% for 
 = 0.01 and 80% for  = 0.005 . The discounted losses depicted in Fig. 8, however, 
behave less clearly. Summing up, their present value yields a result that is somewhat 
puzzling at first glance: reducing  from 1.5 to 1%, we obtain a slight increase in 
losses from 5.3 to 5.5 trillion US-$, whereas a further reduction of  down to 0.5% 
induces a decrease to 4 trillion US-$. The answer to this puzzle is that lowering the 
rate of social time preference does not only increase mitigation rates, but also it has 
two additional effects: it increases total output via a higher degree of capital accu-
mulation and at the same time it diminishes the real interest rates to be used for dis-
counting.29 Consequently, it seems to be more sensible to compare relative figures 
that are less distorted by these effects. If we look at our calculations in this way, we 
obtain a clear-cut result: reducing  always reduces the relative losses in the present 
value of net output. For  = 0.01 , the relative losses drop down from 0.08 to 0.06%, 
and for  = 0.005 they drop down further to 0.025%. Consequently, if the planner 
uses a sufficiently low rate of social time preference to determine the optimal mitiga-
tion path, a good deal of the economic losses caused by neglecting rate-related dam-
ages will be avoided because optimal mitigation rates are higher.
29 With  = 0.01 , the real interest rates range from 4.8% p.a. for the first period to 2.3% p.a. for the last 
period of the considered time horizon. For  = 0.005 , the corresponding figures are 4.5% and 1.8%.
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8  The case of a fixed temperature target
Concerning the previous analysis, it could be objected that today’s climate policy 
does not seek to enforce an economically optimal mitigation path, but pursues a 
politically fixed temperature target that is well below the optimum level derived 
from the DICE model. Under the Copenhagen Agreement, the international com-
munity focused on keeping the temperature increase compared to the pre-industrial 
level below 2 °C, and under the Paris Agreement, this target has been tightened to 
1.5 °C. Within DICE-2016R, however, the target of 1.5 °C is not attainable at all, 
and the feasibility of the 2 °C target would require a substantial adjustment of the 


































































Fig. 7  Optimal mitigation rates: differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for varying rates of 




































































r] ρ=0.015  ρ=0.01   ρ=0.005
Fig. 8  Discounted losses in net output for varying rates of social time preference 
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only from 2150 as mentioned in Sect.  6, but already in the near term (Nordhaus 
2019). We therefore follow the approach taken by Nordhaus (2018) and consider the 
less ambitious target of 2.5 °C.30
Before proceeding, it has to be emphasized that the DICE model’s problems 
to cope with the temperature targets of 1.5 and 2 °C do not imply at all that these 
targets are unattainable for climate policy. As shown by the projections of the 
IPCC (2014c, Chapter  6), there exist several mitigation pathways that stabilize 
the greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level of 450–500 ppm 
during this century, thereby ensuring with high confidence that the increase in 
global mean temperature will be kept below 2  °C. Moreover, under more pro-
nounced and more rapid mitigation efforts, even the target of 1.5  °C is still 
achievable (IPCC 2018, Chapter 2). This apparent contradiction to the results of 
the DICE model has mainly two reasons. First, in contrast to DICE, the large-
scale IAMs, which are used for the projections of the IPCC, usually include a 
complex representation of the energy sector that allows for a more detailed analy-
sis of mitigation options. Second, the IPPC projections reaching the 2 °C target 
often rely on the widespread deployment of “negative emissions” technologies 
already in the second half of the century (IPCC, 2014, p. 12). This is in contrast 
to the more pessimistic assumptions about the availability of these technologies 
employed in the DICE model.
As shown at the left-hand scale of Fig. 9, maximizing welfare in DICE-2016R 
under the additional restriction TAT(t) ≤ 2.5 leads to sharply increasing mitigation 
rates that reach their temporary limit of 100% already in 2035 before they jump 
again to 120% in 2150. As a result, compared to the unrestricted optimum discussed 
in Sect.  6, the rise in temperature is slowed down and rate-related damages are 
reduced considerably. Hence, if climate policy successfully pursues the 2.5 °C target 
along the optimal trajectory calculated by DICE-2016R, the incentive for additional 
mitigation measures that aim at reducing rate-related damages would decline and 
the time frame available for taking such measures would shrink down to a short time 
period until 2035.
Due to these effects, the differences in mitigation rates between DICE-2016R 
and DICE-RD vanish almost completely if we assume our base scenario with a 
damage parameter of  = 2.5 and a threshold of 0.1 °C per decade. Noticeable dif-
ferences only occur if the corresponding assumptions are tightened. To derive an 
(possible) upper limit for the impact of rate-related damages on mitigation rates, 
we use the “worst case” scenario introduced in Sect. 7.1. Under these assumptions, 
accounting for rate-related damages leads to a re-allocation of abatement activities 
during the first couple of periods (see Fig.  9, right hand scale): Beginning with 
30 This target seems also to be more realistic in view of the national-level commitments on reducing  CO2 
emissions under the Paris Agreement (Rogelj et al. 2016).
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2015, in the first three periods, the optimal mitigation rates increase by up to about 
9 percentage points, and in the next two periods an opposite effect occurs.31 After-
ward, there are no more differences because the mitigation rates in both models 
reach their upper limit of 100%.
Moreover, Fig. 10 shows the discounted losses in net output that occur if climate 
policy ignores rate-related damages and employs the mitigation rates resulting from 
DICE-2016R as shown at the left-hand scale of Fig.  9. During the first three peri-
ods beginning in 2015, the losses are negative such that the net output increases. In 
the following periods, the losses become positive, but they decline rapidly over time 
and already after two decades, they would be barely noticeable. Aggregated over the 
complete time horizon, we observe a slight increase in the present value net output 
that amounts to 3.2 trillion 2005 US-Dollar or 0.05%, respectively. At first glance, this 
result might seem somewhat surprising. However, it should be borne in mind that the 
DICE model does not maximize the present value of net output, but the level of total 
welfare as given by (2), and the latter figure actually decreases slightly by 0.025% if 
rate-related damages are ignored.32
The implications of the above analysis are obvious: if climate policy succeeds 
in restricting the absolute increase in temperature to 2.5 °C (or even below) along 
a steady time path, the rate of temperature increase will be slowed down consider-
ably and additional mitigation measures aiming at a further reduction of rate-related 
damages are hardly feasible or necessary. Such a policy, however, would require 

























































































Fig. 9  Optimal mitigation rates for the 2.5  °C target. Left-hand scale: DICE-2016R. Right-hand scale: 
differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R (“worst case” scenario)
31 Note that both effects almost completely cancel each other out, such that the cumulative carbon emis-
sions at the beginning of 2040 remain virtually constant.
32 This negative effect on welfare is mainly driven by the change in the intertemporal distribution of net 
output during the first couple of periods.
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9  Summary and conclusions
Given the growing evidence concerning the importance of the rate of temperature 
increase, neglecting this aspect is an obvious shortcoming in the economics of cli-
mate change. Especially IAMs that aim at calculating optimal mitigation rates 
should incorporate all sources of damages to generate reliable results. In the present 
paper, we contributed to the corresponding literature in four ways:
-First, we showed how to incorporate damages caused by the rate of temperature 
increase into the well-known DICE-2016R model. In doing so, we particularly 
accounted for the hitherto neglected fact that rate-related damages are only likely 
to occur when the rate of temperature increase exceeds a certain threshold that 
overstrains the adaptive capacity of ecological and social systems. Moreover, we 
decided to model the relationship between damages caused by the absolute level 
of temperature increase and damages caused by the rate of temperature increase 
in a multiplicative instead of an additive manner. The reason is that systems, 
which are already disturbed by the absolute level of temperature increase, will 
probably have more problems coping with the additional stress stemming from a 
high rate of temperature increase.
-Second, using our modified model DICE-RD we analyzed various scenarios to 
derive a large range of simulation results. A climate policy, which relies on the 
mitigation rates resulting from the original DICE-2016R model, can lead to sig-
nificant rate-related damages, since it implies a rate of temperature increase that 
considerably exceeds the best-guess threshold of 0.1  °C/decade during the cur-
rent century. Accounting for these potential damages, optimality requires a con-
siderable increase in mitigation rates.
-Third, we quantified the losses in net output caused by an insufficient cli-
mate policy that ignores rate-related damages. Depending on the scenario 









































































Environmental Economics and Policy Studies (2020) 22:555–584 
the optimal solution range from almost negligible 0.03% to more substantial 
0.57%. An even more severe impact, however, cannot be ruled out completely 
at the present state of insights. Although the vast majority of output losses 
occur in the distant future, everything else equal, the higher the applied rate 
of social time preference, the higher the present value of relative losses. Con-
sequently, a sufficiently low rate of social time preference when determining 
the mitigation path to be realized by climate policies could avoid a good deal 
of the economic losses caused by neglecting rate-related damages.
-Fourth, we analyzed the case of a politically fixed temperature target of 2.5 °C 
that requires mitigation rates of 100% already in the near future. If such a policy 
is successful, the rate of temperature increase will be slowed down considerably 
and additional measures aiming at a further reduction of rate-related damages are 
hardly feasible or necessary. Hence, rate-related damages might be another rea-
son to pursue an ambitious temperature target.
However, the limitations of our work are obvious. Besides the well-known criti-
cisms of DICE and related models (see Sect. 3), it should be emphasized that our 
extension of DICE-2016R adds further uncertainties to the analysis. Although it 
seems to be possible to narrow the empirical range of the critical threshold for 
the rate of temperate increase, there are no reliable data on the specific magnitude 
of rate-related damages available from the literature. Hence, we utilized scenario 
analysis to illustrate the potential effects of such damages. To increase the reli-
ability of our results, it is necessary to narrow the empirical parameterization of 
our extended damage function. For this purpose, much more research is required 
in the natural as well as in the social sciences. Since the vulnerability to the rate 
of temperature increase most likely differs across regions, an application of our 
approach to the regionally disaggregated RICE-model (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000) 
would be an interesting route of further research depending on the future availabil-
ity of reliable regional data.
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Appendix
See appendix Figs. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16






































































Fig. 11  Greenhouse gas emissions in different scenarios of DICE-2016R (business as usual, optimum 


































































Fig. 12  Increase in global mean temperature in different scenarios of DICE-2016R (business as usual, 
optimum and immediate stop) and in DICE-RD (optimum)
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ω=1 (linear) ω=2 (quadrac) ω=3 (cubic)
Fig. 13  Optimal mitigation rates: Differences between DICE-RD and DICE-2016R for varying convexity 


































































ω=1 (linear)     ω=2 (quadrac)     ω=3 (cubic)
Fig. 14  Discounted losses in net output for varying convexity parameters  (assuming  = 2.5 and 
 = 0.1)
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